Deterring Armageddon: A Biography of NATO

Deterring Armageddon: A Biography of NATO. Peter Apps. 2024. Headline Publishing Group. 624 pp.

Back Cover

The history of the world's most successful military alliance, from the wrecked Europe of 1945 to Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine.

Deterring Armageddon takes the reader from backroom deals that led to NATO's creation, through the Cold War, the Balkans and Afghanistan to the current confrontation with the Kremlin following the invasion of Ukraine. It examines the tightrope between a powerful United States sometimes flirting with isolationism and European nations with their ever-evolving wishes for autonomy and influence. Having spent much of its life preparing for conflicts that might never come, NATO has sometimes found itself in wars that few had predicted - and with its members now again planning for a potential major European conflict.

It is a tale of tension, danger, rivalry, conflict, big personalities and high-stakes - as well as espionage, politics and protest. From the Korean War to the pandemic, the Berlin and Cuba crises to the chaotic evacuation from Kabul, Deterring Armageddon tells how the alliance has shaped and been shaped by history - and looks ahead to what might be the most dangerous era it has ever faced.

 

Quotes

A simple document that, had it existed earlier, might have prevented two world wars.

—President Harry S. Truman. 

The fourteen articles of the NATO treaty have offered just the right balance of clarity and vagueness to keep the alliance going, providing both flexibility and a sense of mission.

—Modern-day NATO officials.  

NATO relies on momentum, and a lot of the momentum is generated by a sense of threat and fear.

—Andrea Kendall-Taylor, former US intelligence official.

We thought for a while that if we have mutual relationships with a nation that we trade with, and economic interdependency, there will never be war again. Well, that has been proved wrong.

—Admiral Robert Bauer. 

—How many people work for NATO? 
—About half.

—Secretary General Joseph Luns.

[NATO is] as weak as the . . . nation states want to make it or as strong as they want to make it.

—Secretary General George Robertson.

Consensus isn’t everyone saying yes. It’s no one saying no.

 —Senior NATO official.

The last thing that a leader may be is pessimistic if he is to achieve success.

—Dwight D. Eisenhower to Averell Harriman.

The US needed to add conditions to its defence of Europe, or consider pulling out. 

—John F. Kennedy.

Summary + Notes

INTRODUCTION.

NATO has proved remarkably effective at ensuring that ‘not a single inch’ of its territory in the North Atlantic area has fallen to a foreign power. Founded in 1949 to prevent another world war by uniting Western democracies against Soviet expansionism, its founders believed it was the only way to avoid a catastrophic conflict in Europe. The alliance has endured for 75 years, adapting to Cold War tensions, post-Soviet expansion, and modern threats like cyber warfare. Despite internal disagreements and bureaucratic challenges, NATO remains the world’s longest-lasting military alliance, credited with preserving peace among its members. The book explores NATO’s evolution, from its Cold War origins to its role in the 21st century, emphasizing its ability to deter aggression and maintain unity despite political and strategic differences.

CONTEXT IN 2023.

1. A Sense of Threat and Fear (2022–2023) 

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine revitalized NATO, prompting rapid military reinforcements in Eastern Europe. The alliance’s response included deploying battle groups to vulnerable member states like Estonia, Latvia, and Poland. The war in Ukraine underscored NATO’s relevance, as members united to support Kyiv while reinforcing their own defenses. The chapter highlights NATO’s strategic shift from "out-of-area" operations (e.g., Afghanistan) back to collective defense, driven by the fear of Russian aggression spreading to NATO territory.

NATO’s three core tasks:

1. Deterrence and defence.
2. Crisis prevention and management.
3. Cooperative security.

2. A Very Political Alliance (2023) 

NATO’s expansion to include Finland (and eventually Sweden) underscored its political nature, where consensus-driven decision-making often clashes with national interests. Turkey’s veto over Sweden’s membership highlighted the challenges of unanimity. NATO’s bureaucratic structure, the role of the Secretary General as a catalyst for consensus, and the delicate balances, between military strategy and political diplomacy, or between U.S. leadership and European autonomy.

Dwight D. Eisenhower became the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in january 1951. Winston Churchill persuaded Lord Hastings Ismay to become NATO's first secretary general in 1952. Twofold aim: to prepare for war, and to be seen as credible enough to deter aggressive action by the Kremlin.

 CONCEPTION AND BIRTH. 

3. From the Ruins of Dunkirk (1945–1948)  

Hitler had been dead less than two weeks, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s had died the previous month, and Churchill was swept from power. Operation UNTHINKABLE, a unilateral British plan to launch an immediate pre-emptive war against the Soviet Union in mid-1945. Ernest Bevin, born in 1881 to a single mother in rural Somerset, started work as an unskilled labourer aged eleven before founding Britain’s most powerful labour body, the Transport and General Workers’ Union: The soviet state is contrary absolutely to our concept of democracy. New Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee appointed Bevin as his Foreign Secretary specifically to stand up for Britain and a devastated Europe against the Kremlin. Postdam Conference: Harry S. Truman, Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill, later Attlee. Charles de Gaulle would never forgive his allies for not inviting him to Potsdam. The Soviet Union demobilised –but it maintained three-fifths of its wartime strength and started fraud and intimidation, stripping, repression and annexation of other nations. The George Kennan 8,000-word telegram: The Soviet state had no intent – or even, in its current Stalinist state, ability – to embrace peaceful cooperation with the West. Britain and France were negotiating their own peace treaties with the Kremlin. US choice between isolationism or alliance. Truman Doctrine: Washington will stand firmly against Soviet efforts to expand the Eastern bloc by violence or subversion. In June 1947, Marshall presented the new US economic rescue package in a speech at Harvard University. Early in 1948, came the disappearance of Czechoslovakia as a free democratic state. The Dunkirk treaty between Britain and France. The Treaty of Brussels signed by Britain, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium. When France joined it became the Western Union Defence Organisation.

4. Airlift and Alliance (1948–1949) 

The ‘Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance – known as the Rio Treaty – was a ‘hemispheric defence’ agreement, in which all signatories agreed to treat an attack on one as an attack on all. Hickerson and Achilles were soon determined to take it as a model to build an Atlantic structure. NATO would be a different type of body, committed to defensive action but built for confrontation. The 1948 Czechoslovakia coup, followed by the ‘suicide’ of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk, sent a shiver of apprehension across the western hemisphere. The Soviet Union might inadvertently start a war by underestimating US commitment to the defence of Europe. By early 1948 the US, Britain and France were advancing secret plans to create a democratic state of West Germany from the ‘bizone’. When the Soviets discovered this in March, they withdrew from the Allied Control Council that administered the city. In Washington, the bureaucratic process of building a larger treaty were underway. ‘We cannot appease, conciliate or provoke the Soviets,’ wrote Douglas. ‘We can only arrest and deter them by a real show of resolution.’ John Foster Dulles win over his fellow Republicans on Capitol Hill, Hickerson focused on the Truman administration and the Vandenberg Resolution authorized the negotiation of a transatlantic treaty. The resulting compromise – an open-ended agreement that any party could call for a review after ten years and leave after twenty – was vital for NATO’s long-term growth. Berlin blackade: Operation VITTLES, the beginning of an airlift that would last 323 days. The airlift would cost 101 lives, including 40 Britons and 31 Americans, with the loss of 25 aircraft. British Prime Minister Clement Attlee agreed to let US B-29 nuclear-armed Superfortress bombers – the aircraft that had dropped atomic bombs on Japan less than three years earlier – fly from British bases. An initial thirty-day deployment was extended to sixty days, becoming a permanent presence for the defence of Europe  On 4 April 1949 twelve nations came together on Constitution Avenue. The treaty’s Article 5—collective defense—became its cornerstone. The United States was for the first time formally entering into the outside world, abandoning isolationism, but there was little structure at all behind the commitments in the charter, and no military command system.

THE FIRST COLD WAR.

5. Putting the structure (1949–1951)  

NATO’s early years focused on building military structures under General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who became its first SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe). Eisenhower’s leadership was pivotal in building a cohesive defense structure, drawing on his experience from World War II, despite resource constraints and disagreements over strategy, such as reliance on nuclear deterrence. The Korean War (1950) demonstrated the need for a unified defense, leading to the integration of West Germany into NATO and the establishment of permanent military commands. Tensions between the U.S., which favored a forward defense strategy, and European nations, which were more cautious about provoking the Soviet Union.

On 29 August 1949, less than a month after the U.S. Senate ratified the NATO treaty, the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb at a test site in Kazakhstan. The explosion shattered America’s nuclear monopoly and sent shockwaves through Western capitals. Meanwhile, U.S. B-29 bombers conducted joint training exercises with British, French, Belgian, and Dutch forces, a display of unity in the face of growing Soviet power. By 1950, the Soviet Union maintained four million troops under arms, with an additional 800,000 available from Eastern Bloc nations. In stark contrast, the entire U.S. military had been reduced to less than 1.5 million personnel—scattered globally and representing just 10% of its 1945 strength. The imbalance left Western Europe vulnerable. Against this backdrop, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed a bold solution on 9 May 1950: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This initiative aimed to bind European economies together, reducing the risk of future conflicts by integrating key industries.

At 4 a.m. on 25 June 1950, North Korean artillery unleashed a devastating barrage, marking the start of a full-scale invasion of South Korea. Backed by up to 200 Soviet-supplied aircraft, North Korean forces overwhelmed their southern neighbors. The U.S. and its allies were caught off guard. As the situation deteriorated, U.S. broadcaster Edward R. Murrow warned his audience: "If South Korea falls, it is only reasonable to expect that there will be other—and bolder—ventures." The conflict did not just threaten Asia; it exposed gaping holes in Western defense strategy. The Korean War did not change NATO’s fundamental purpose, but it accelerated its evolution. The alliance, still in its infancy, faced a harsh reality: If a Soviet offensive struck Europe, the war would be won or lost in West Germany—a nation not yet even part of NATO. West German Chancellor Conrad Adenauer understood the stakes. As he later declared, "The fate of the world will not be decided in Korea, but in the heart of Europe."

By October 1950, the war in Korea had taken a dramatic turn. As UN forces crossed into North Korea, Kim Il Sung urgently requested Chinese intervention. On 25 October, China launched a massive counteroffensive. General Douglas MacArthur, commanding UN forces, publicly advocated using nuclear weapons—only to be sharply rebuked by President Truman. The crisis revealed deep divisions in U.S. strategy and underscored the need for stronger transatlantic leadership.

On 23 October 1950, Dwight D. Eisenhower—then a civilian and president of Columbia University—received an urgent call from the White House. President Truman asked him to return to service, this time to lead NATO’s defensive forces. The official decision to appoint a Supreme Commander for NATO, as its first SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) was formalized at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels on 18 December 1950. Within days, Colonel Robert Brown—who had built Eisenhower’s D-Day headquarters—was in Paris, overseeing the setup of NATO’s new command center at the Hôtel Astoria. Truckloads of U.S. troops arrived from Heidelberg, transporting equipment and supplies to establish the alliance’s operational hub. Amid these developments, the loss of British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin in April 1951 was deeply felt. Winston Churchill praised him as a "valiant spirit" and "wartime comrade," while Truman called him "the embodiment of rugged honesty and the ancient English virtues." His leadership had been instrumental in shaping NATO’s early years.

6. The Eisenhower Spiral (1951–1952)  

Eisenhower outlined his strategy for defending Western Europe to Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery: The West, with its 350 million people, vast industrial capacity, and skilled workforce, had no reason to fear the 190 million Soviets, whom he dismissed as "backward." The real threat, he argued, was disunity among Western allies—while the Soviets stood united. This conviction would guide Eisenhower throughout his career, both as NATO’s Supreme Commander and later as U.S. President. As he wrote in his diary, the solution was clear: "There is only one thing for us to do—and that is to get this combined spiral of strength going up. These people believe in the cause. Now, they have got to believe in themselves."

In Paris, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) lived up to its name. Its first senior staff—mostly Americans who had served with Eisenhower since World War II—laid the foundation for NATO’s operations during its critical first decade. For the first half of 1951, SHAPE operated from the Hôtel Astoria on the Champs-Élysées. By April, Eisenhower declared it fully operational, with Montgomery—wearing his trademark beret—seated in the front row among senior commanders. The two leaders who had liberated Western Europe now stood together again, this time to defend it.

The permanent headquarters would later move to Rocquencourt, a forested estate 25 kilometers west of Paris, originally the French president’s shooting retreat. Eisenhower understood that NATO’s success depended on more than planes, tanks, and ships. As he remarked, "NATO needs an eloquent and inspired Moses as much as it needs military hardware." To Army Chief of Staff Joseph Collins, he framed the challenge bluntly: "Our problem is one of selling and inspiring." Yet, his task was complicated by rising neutralist sentiment in Europe and skepticism at home. For the first time, Congress debated whether the U.S. should attach conditions to its defense of Europe—or even consider withdrawing.

Critics like Senator Robert Taft and Herbert Hoover advocated for an "American Gibraltar" approach—relying on nuclear deterrence and avoiding overseas commitments. Eisenhower, however, saw the dangers of isolationism. While he opposed what he viewed as wasteful New Deal-style spending, he also recognized that "national security and national solvency are mutually dependent." A permanent, crushing military burden, he warned, could undermine democracy itself. By October 1951, he had privately aligned with the Republican Party, pledging to resign his commission if offered the presidential nomination. His concerns extended beyond politics: "We can only say that properly balanced strength will promote the possibility of avoiding war," he wrote, emphasizing the need for both security and fiscal responsibility.

NATO’s strategic reach grew in October 1951, when Turkey and Greece were approved for membership. Their accession, formalized in Lisbon in February 1952, extended the alliance’s frontier eastward—giving NATO its first direct border with the Soviet Union. Eisenhower’s message was consistent: Western democracy had to be defended without bankrupting the nations protecting it. The balance between strength and sustainability would define NATO’s future. 

7. Massive Retaliation, Massive Divisions (1952–1958)

In just over a year, Dwight D. Eisenhower transformed NATO from a theoretical pact into a fully operational military organization. Under his leadership, the alliance expanded its ground forces to 98 divisions by 1954, all capable of full mobilization within 90 days. Yet, as NATO’s planners explored the potential use of atomic weapons, they confronted a grim reality: nuclear war could mean near-instantaneous annihilation. General Lauris Norstad, commander of NATO’s air forces, later revealed that early war plans assumed the U.S. might have only 15 atomic bombs available in Europe—a stark reminder of the era’s precarious balance of power.

Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General, became the alliance’s guiding force—earning the nickname "Papa OTAN". Ismay and his team established the International Secretariat in a prefabricated annex beside the Palais de Chaillot, keeping the organization lean and efficient. By July 1954, NATO’s civilian staff—including interpreters and translators—numbered just 189. Ismay’s tenure laid the groundwork for NATO’s enduring structures and functions, many of which would define the alliance for generations. As Theodore Achilles, a key NATO diplomat, later observed: "Practically everything accomplished through an international organization is achieved not in meetings, but in the delegates’ lounge—over coffee, tea, martinis, whiskey, or vodka." 

The early 1950s marked a pivotal shift in global military power. In October 1952, Britain—determined to maintain its status as a world power—successfully detonated its first nuclear device off the coast of Australia. The decision had been unequivocal: "Whatever it costs," Britain would not be left behind in the atomic age. Meanwhile, the U.S. accelerated its own nuclear capabilities. In April 1952, the B-52 bomber made its maiden flight, while the U.S. Army unveiled the "Redstone" missile—a nuclear-capable ballistic weapon derived from Nazi Germany’s V-2 rocket, designed by Wernher von Braun. The Cold War’s tensions flared on multiple fronts. In June 1953, East Berlin workers staged an uprising, demanding better pay, conditions, and democratic rights. The Soviet response was brutal: tanks rolled in, crushing the rebellion. Over 250 protesters were killed, and 1,000 more imprisoned. That same summer, the Korean War ended in a fragile armistice (27 July 1953), with both sides returning to positions near their pre-war borders. The conflict reinforced a chilling consensus among U.S. defense and diplomatic circles: Only the explicit threat of massive nuclear retaliation could deter Soviet aggression—even in conventional wars. 

By 1955, NATO faced a critical decision: admitting West Germany into the alliance. The move was controversial, but strategic necessity won out. General Alfred Gruenther, Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff and later Supreme Commander of NATO forces, was hailed as the "human IBM machine, the perfect staff officer, the smartest man in the U.S. Army, and the most factual man of his times." West Germany’s inclusion redefined NATO’s purpose, famously summarized as: "To keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down." In response, the Soviet Union formalized its own alliance—the Warsaw Pact (May 1955)—binding Eastern Bloc nations in a permanent military coalition. As the Cold War evolved, Soviet "peace propaganda" promoted the idea of a "Europe for the Europeans", while a new term entered the geopolitical lexicon: "détente"—a relaxation of tensions.

Yet, crises continued to test NATO’s resolve. In French Indochina (soon to be Vietnam), Ho Chi Minh’s Vietcong, backed by Russia and China, escalated their insurgency. By mid-1956, the Suez Crisis erupted after Egyptian President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. When Israel, Britain, and France launched a military intervention, NATO found itself sidelined—a bystander to events that would reshape the Middle East and Europe. The alliance also struggled to respond effectively to the Hungarian Revolution (1956), where Soviet forces brutally suppressed pro-democracy protests. While NATO debated reforms to improve decision-making and responsiveness, real power remained concentrated among its largest members—particularly the United States. As one diplomat later reflected, "It was not as bad as Suez." But the crises of the 1950s made one thing clear: NATO’s greatest challenge would be adapting to a world where Cold War tensions could erupt anywhere, at any time. 

8. Sputnik, Nukes, and Charles de Gaulle (1957–1960)

The 1957 launch of Sputnik sent shockwaves through the West. Overnight, the Soviet Union demonstrated its technological prowess, casting doubt on NATO’s reliance on U.S. nuclear guarantees. The space race had begun, and with it, a deeper crisis of confidence in transatlantic security. French President Charles de Gaulle seized on the moment, pushing for an independent nuclear deterrent and openly criticizing U.S. dominance within NATO. France’s pursuit of its own atomic arsenal strained relations with Washington and set the stage for years of transatlantic friction. By May 1957, Lord Ismay stepped down as NATO Secretary General after five pivotal years, making way for Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium. Ismay left behind an alliance that had weathered the Suez Crisis, but now faced new challenges. That same year, Dwight D. Eisenhower met with Harold Macmillan, who had replaced the politically wounded Anthony Eden as British Prime Minister. Their discussions underscored a shifting dynamic: NATO was entering a new era.

Under General Lauris Norstad, NATO’s fourth Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the alliance continued to evolve. Norstad—the last of Eisenhower’s trusted circle—oversaw the deployment of America’s Thor and Jupiter missiles, capable of striking targets up to 1,700 miles away, and the Regulus cruise missile program. These weapons extended NATO’s nuclear reach, but they also deepened European dependence on U.S. strategy. The December 1957 NATO summit—the first in the alliance’s history—became a defining moment. Leaders gathered to address the growing nuclear threat and Eisenhower’s proposal for "nuclear sharing", a plan to give European allies a greater role in nuclear decision-making. By the end of the decade, U.S.-built missiles were stationed in Britain, Italy, and Turkey, reinforcing NATO’s deterrence posture. Yet, beneath the surface, cracks were forming.

De Gaulle’s frustration with NATO was twofold: He resented what he saw as American overreach, fearing the alliance could infringe on French sovereignty by controlling French forces in wartime. At the same time, he demanded more global support for France’s colonial ambitions. His stance was uncompromising. When Secretary of State John Foster Dulles met with de Gaulle in Paris on July 5, the French leader made his position clear: France was "not interested" in cooperating with NATO on infrastructure, nuclear weapons, or anything else that might limit its autonomy. Tensions escalated further in November 1957, when Soviet troops blocked U.S. supply convoys on the 110-kilometer autobahn linking West Germany to Berlin—a city that, while not officially NATO territory, remained a symbol of Western resolve. The incident highlighted Berlin’s vulnerability and the limits of NATO’s authority, as U.S., French, and British forces there operated outside direct alliance command.

In a bid to ease Cold War tensions, Eisenhower invited Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to the White House in 1959. But hopes for détente collapsed spectacularly on May 1, 1960, when a CIA U-2 spy plane, piloted by Gary Powers, was shot down deep inside Soviet airspace. The Paris Summit disintegrated in acrimony. Khrushchev stormed out, and Eisenhower’s planned visit to Moscow was abruptly canceled. The fallout was immediate and severe. Eisenhower’s frustration with European allies boiled over. In August 1959, he vented to Norstad: We sent our divisions there to help them in an emergency. Now, if we talk about taking out one division, they claim we are deserting them. The incident exposed the fragility of NATO’s unity—and foreshadowed the turbulent decade ahead.

9. Testing Kennedy in Berlin (1961)

The 1961 Berlin Crisis, culminating in the construction of the Berlin Wall, became a defining moment for NATO. President John F. Kennedy’s resolute response to Soviet provocations reassured European allies, but it also laid bare the terrifying risks of miscalculation in an era of nuclear brinkmanship. The transition from Eisenhower to Kennedy marked a profound shift for NATO. When Kennedy entered the White House in January 1961, his administration was more acutely aware of the threat of atomic war than any before—or since. The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP-62), drafted in 1960, allocated 3,200 nuclear warheads to strike the Soviet Union, China, and other Communist states in the event of war—an attack projected to kill 360 to 450 million people. Against this grim backdrop, Dirk Stikker took the helm as NATO’s new Secretary General, tasked with navigating an alliance under unprecedented strain. 

On 6 January 1961, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev delivered a defiant speech, endorsing "wars of liberation" and signaling a harder line on Berlin. Kennedy and his team—including Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara—sought a more "flexible response" to Soviet aggression, moving beyond Eisenhower’s doctrine of massive retaliation. The stakes became clear at Kennedy and Khrushchev’s first summit in Vienna on 4 June. Khrushchev threatened to recognize East Germany as a sovereign state, effectively ending the 1945 Potsdam Agreement that guaranteed Western access to Berlin. Kennedy’s reply was unequivocal: "If that’s to be the case, there will be war, Mr. Chairman." As tensions escalated, McNamara and SACEUR Lauris Norstad urged Kennedy to reinforce U.S. troops in Europe. The crisis was reaching a breaking point.

On 12 August 1961, East Germany sealed all but 13 of Berlin’s 120 crossing points, erecting what would become the Berlin Wall. Two Soviet divisions encircled the city in a show of force, while the world watched in shock. The U.S. responded swiftly. The White House announced that Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and retired General Lucius Clay—the hero of the 1948 Berlin Airlift—would fly into Berlin, reaffirming America’s commitment. At the Checkpoint Charlie crossing on Friedrichstrasse, U.S. and Soviet tanks faced off in a tense standoff. Though a fragile understanding emerged—Soviet and East German guards would permit Allied military personnel to enter East Berlin—no one was satisfied. Kennedy acknowledged the grim reality: "It’s not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than a war." Behind the scenes, deep disagreements persisted. McNamara argued that conventional warfare in Germany might be possible without triggering a nuclear exchange. Norstad, however, believed any major conflict would escalate to nuclear war almost immediately. NATO’s smaller members grew increasingly uneasy. As Rusk wrote to Kennedy, the allies now understood "our reasons for seeking alternatives between surrender and incineration." The crisis had exposed the limits of unity—and the horrifying choices ahead. 

10. Cuba (1962)

The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world closer to nuclear war than ever before—and its repercussions reshaped NATO. While the alliance stood firmly behind the U.S. during the standoff, European members feared being dragged into a conflict over which they had little influence. The crisis exposed a fundamental paradox: Europe often demanded greater engagement in transatlantic decisions, yet balked at sharing responsibility—whether in military spending, diplomatic risks, or decision-making. In the end, the crisis strengthened transatlantic consultation and led to the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group, giving European allies a more meaningful voice in NATO’s nuclear strategy.

By April 1962, the immediate Berlin Crisis appeared to have eased. As one official observed: "I think the immediate crisis in Berlin is over, and that we have won this round." West Berlin’s economic and cultural revival continued, and supply routes remained open despite the Soviet cordon. But the underlying tensions persisted. NATO’s unwritten agreement to maintain West Berlin as a U.S.–British–French enclave deep within East Germany was a triumph of resolve, but it came at a cost. General Lauris Norstad, NATO’s Supreme Commander, felt his relationship with the White House deteriorating. By July 1962, he offered his resignation—a sign of the growing strain between military leadership and political authority. The alliance faced another shocking revelation: Soviet infiltration of Europe had reached alarming depths. By the end of 1961, intelligence confirmed that France, Germany, Britain, and Sweden had been deeply compromised. For senior officials, the scale of Soviet penetration was not just a security failure—it was a humiliation.

By mid-October 1962, the U.S. discovered 162 Soviet nuclear warheads in Cuba, including 90 tactical devices. In Washington, officials feared a U.S. strike on Cuba could provoke a Soviet seizure of West Berlin. Kennedy’s team settled on a naval blockade as the least provocative option, but airstrikes and invasion plans were also prepared. Crucially, Kennedy insisted on consulting European allies—though their role remained largely symbolic. On 21 October, Kennedy explicitly ordered—with recording devices running—that no Jupiter missile in Turkey could be launched without his direct authorization. Elsewhere, Strategic Air Command (SAC) officers, including those at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, retained autonomy to launch nuclear weapons if they detected "unambiguous" evidence of war. In a cable to Norstad on 22 October, Kennedy acknowledged the difficult position he had placed the alliance in: "As this situation has developed, I have given much thought to the impacts upon NATO and your task as SACEUR. I regret the inability to widen the circle of discussion during this period… While I know our actions create a difficult situation for you, I have every confidence in your leadership to help us through this critical time." Yet, the Kennedy administration privately dismissed NATO’s role as "very marginal" in crises. The reality was stark: U.S. forces assigned to NATO operated under direct American command, often independently of alliance structures.

As the crisis subsided, U.S. patience with Europe wore thin. One American official noted: "My impression is that other [European] ministers are getting seriously concerned, partly because they sense that U.S. patience is running out. Whether this will result in effective action [to build Europe’s own defenses] remains to be seen." Just a week after the crisis ended, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson addressed the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, reflecting on NATO’s evolving challenges. As the alliance approached its 14th anniversary, he remarked: "Like a youth of the same age, NATO is growing out of its clothes." The 1960s and ’70s would bring a new reality: "In the 1940s and 1950s, the threats to NATO were external. In the 1960s and ’70s, the threats were all internal."

DÉTENTE, DISAGREEMENTS AND REAGAN

11. The Shadow of Vietnam (1963–1974) 

In the 1960s, the NATO Secretary General faced a new reality: "For the first time, he spent as much time keeping the allies together as keeping the Soviets out." The decade would test the alliance’s unity like never before. On 10 June 1963, President John F. Kennedy made a bold unilateral move, offering the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which banned all but underground nuclear tests. Signed on 5 August, the treaty marked a small but significant step toward arms control. That same year, the U.S. and Soviet Union established the Kremlin-Washington hotline, a direct communication link to prevent accidental escalation. Yet, even as Kennedy pursued détente, transatlantic tensions simmered. In June 1963, French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew the French Atlantic Fleet from NATO command, just as he had done with the Mediterranean Fleet in 1958. His frustration with U.S. dominance and NATO’s decision-making only grew. Then, on 21 February 1966, de Gaulle dropped a bombshell: He announced that all foreign forces must leave France. The decision forced both SHAPE and NATO’s civilian headquarters in Paris to relocate. By 1 April 1967, a new SHAPE headquarters opened in Mons, Belgium, built in record time by Belgian construction crews. While de Gaulle’s departure from NATO’s integrated military structure initially simplified alliance reforms, it also exposed deeper divisions. The U.S. grew increasingly frustrated with Europe’s reluctance to share defense burdens, particularly as European allies refused to join the U.S. in Vietnam.

By the late 1960s, NATO faced another growing challenge: A "generation that does not remember why we got into an Atlantic alliance to begin with," as U.S. Ambassador Cleveland warned. The Prague Spring of 1968 became a turning point. When Soviet tanks crushed the reform movement on 20–21 August, Moscow justified its actions with the Brezhnev Doctrine—the right to intervene in any socialist state facing "counter-revolution." Yet, NATO’s response was sluggish. For the first critical hours of the invasion, its sole teleprinter was out of order, and radar stations failed to detect Soviet planes entering Czechoslovak airspace. The German delegation later criticized NATO’s initial reaction as "practically non-existent."

The 1970s brought a shift in strategy: NATO adopted a dual approach—balancing military deterrence with the diplomacy of détente. When Richard Nixon took office in 1969, he signaled a new era of U.S.-Soviet negotiations. His 20 January inaugural address set the stage for détente with Brezhnev, but not everyone was convinced. Willy Brandt, the former Berlin mayor, became West Germany’s first Social Democratic chancellor—and soon faced suspicion from Washington. Alexander Haig, then Nixon’s chief of staff (and later SACEUR), even alleged Kremlin influence over Brandt through his aide, Günter Guillaume, who was exposed as an East German spy in 1973. In Britain, Conservative Edward Heath replaced Labour’s Harold Wilson in the June 1970 election, adding another layer of transatlantic complexity.

By 1973, the Nixon administration declared it the "Year of Europe", demanding that European allies increase defense spending—or risk U.S. troop withdrawals. The warning fell flat. As Henry Kissinger bluntly put it: "The Europeans cannot have it both ways. They cannot expect U.S. security cooperation while pursuing confrontation on economic and political fronts." The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), signed by Nixon and Brezhnev on 27 May 1972, further strained transatlantic relations. Europeans kept their concerns quiet, fearing that public dissent would only weaken their influence. Meanwhile, the Helsinki Process (1972–1975) raised hopes—and fears. The New York Times suggested the Soviets saw it as a way to "seal the division of Europe" and "pronounce the formal end of the Cold War."

In October 1971, Joseph Luns, a veteran Dutch diplomat, became NATO’s new Secretary General. His experience was unmatched, but the challenges remained:

1. Military readiness: The first REFORGER exercises (1969–1980s) revealed that U.S. equipment in Europe was often poorly maintained.
2. Strategic arms talks: The SALT negotiations shifted power from NATO’s North Atlantic Council to Washington and Moscow, leaving Europeans on the sidelines.
3. Isolationist pressures: The U.S. narrowly avoided electing an isolationist president, but the threat of reduced American commitment loomed large.

As Nixon resigned and Gerald Ford took office on 9 August 1974, General Alexander Haig—now Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)—faced the daunting task of holding the alliance together in an era of uncertainty and shifting global dynamics. 

12. Back to the Brink (1975–1980) Soviet military buildups and the deployment of SS-20 missiles in Europe reignited Cold War tensions. NATO’s "dual-track" decision (1979) to deploy U.S. Pershing II missiles while negotiating arms control with the USSR reflected its balancing act between deterrence and diplomacy.

"NATO is saved every ten years or so by a Soviet flare-up that scares everyone back into line." In July 1975, President Gerald Ford, Leonid Brezhnev, and delegations from 34 other nations gathered in Finland to sign the Helsinki Final Act. The agreement aimed to ease Cold War tensions by promoting human rights, economic cooperation, and military transparency. Yet, within a year, the Helsinki deal proved deeply disappointing—its promises of détente overshadowed by Soviet aggression.

The 1976 U.S. election brought a shift in leadership. Former California Governor Ronald Reagan challenged Democrat Jimmy Carter, who ultimately won on a platform of human rights and moral diplomacy. However, Carter’s idealism soon clashed with Cold War realities. To reassure nervous NATO allies, Vice President Walter Mondale flew to Brussels in early 1977, reaffirming U.S. commitment to the alliance. But transatlantic trust remained fragile. In January 1979, leaders from France, Germany, the U.S., and Britain met secretly in Guadeloupe—excluding smaller NATO members—to agree on a "dual-track" approach to Soviet threats: negotiations paired with military modernization. Central to this strategy was the Enhanced Radiation Weapon (ERW), or "neutron bomb"—a tactical nuclear weapon designed to kill personnel while minimizing damage to infrastructure. When its existence was leaked to The Washington Post on 6 June 1977, it sparked global outrage. Soviet propagandists and anti-war activists condemned it as the "ultimate capitalist weapon"—one that prioritized property over human life. The controversy deepened divisions within NATO, exposing rifts between hawks and doves.

The late 1970s revealed alarming weaknesses in NATO’s communications and logistics. As one official admitted: "We couldn’t go to war if we had to." The alliance responded by adopting "Air-Land Battle", a new combat doctrine that integrated air power, armor, and rapid maneuver warfare. This strategy would later be proven effective in the 1991 Gulf War. Meanwhile, Soviet espionage infiltrated NATO’s ranks. A KGB mole, codenamed "Topaz", later admitted: "NATO was my enemy, and I went into it to destroy it."

The SALT II negotiations between the U.S. and USSR resulted in a June 1979 agreement to limit long-range missiles to 2,400 per side. But Europe remained threatened by Soviet short- and medium-range missiles, which were not covered by the treaty. Tensions escalated dramatically on 9 November 1979, when U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski received a false alarm—a report that Soviet missiles were en route to the U.S.. In a chilling moment, Brzezinski decided not to wake his wife, reasoning: "There would be no point. It would be best for her to be asleep when the first warheads hit." Just weeks later, on Christmas Day 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The move shattered détente and galvanized NATO. President Carter pledged a 5% annual increase in defense spending and withdrew SALT II from Senate consideration.

The 1980s began with a series of near-disasters. In June 1980, the U.S.–Canadian NORAD system mistakenly issued three false missile attack alerts, raising fears of accidental nuclear war. That same year, a bomb exploded under a Brussels road as SACEUR General Alexander Haig’s motorcade passed overhead—a stark reminder of NATO’s vulnerability. The Reagan administration, which took office in 1981, adopted a hardline stance against the USSR. Reagan’s Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59) outlined a nuclear war-fighting strategy, while unrest in Eastern Europe—particularly in Poland—threatened to ignite a broader conflict. When Poland declared martial law in December 1981, the U.S. warned that a Soviet intervention would "alter the entire international situation", destroying East-West relations for a generation. 

13. The Gloves Come Off (1981–1982).

"My theory on the Cold War is simple: We win, and they lose." By the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan embodied this uncompromising stance. Yet, the negotiating process with the Soviet Union had strained NATO’s unity, leaving allies divided over strategy and resolve. In March 1981, the Reagan administration launched a series of provocative military exercises along the Soviet border—a deliberate psychological operation designed to rattle Moscow and reassert Western strength. That same month, Reagan survived an assassination attempt, reinforcing his image as a resolute Cold Warrior. Meanwhile, in France, Socialist François Mitterrand assumed the presidency, adding a new dynamic to transatlantic relations. Reagan’s hardline approach extended to economic warfare. During a 1981 summit in Ottawa, he pressured West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to abandon a multibillion-dollar gas pipeline deal that would bring Soviet natural gas from Siberia to Western Europe. The project, if completed, would leave Moscow supplying 20% of NATO Europe’s gas needs—a dangerous dependency in Reagan’s view. But the real threat was Soviet military spending, which U.S. intelligence estimated at 17% of the USSR’s GDP—an unprecedented burden for any peacetime economy, and one that was rapidly becoming unsustainable.

In April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, forcing Britain to mount a daring military response. At its peak, the Royal Navy—a cornerstone of NATO’s maritime strength—committed two-thirds of its surface fleet, 4,000 elite troops, half of its Harrier jets, and several modern submarines to a conflict 8,000 miles from home. The gamble paid off, but the strain on NATO’s resources was undeniable. With U.S. and NATO personnel in Europe facing mounting threats, the alliance could ill afford distractions. 

Back in Germany, Helmut Kohl was rising in the polls, and by October 1983, he would replace Schmidt as chancellor, signaling a shift toward stronger U.S. alignment. That year, NATO’s military drills grew larger and more aggressive—so much so that they nearly triggered catastrophe. The 1983 war games would bring the world closer to nuclear war than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis, a chilling reminder of how easily miscalculation could spiral into disaster. 

14. Dancing Blindly on the Edge (1983).

As the 1980s unfolded, the Kremlin’s obsession with the threat of war reached fever pitch. According to historian Mark Wolf, Soviet leaders became consumed by fears of a Western attack, elevating war warnings to the primary mission of the KGB and Warsaw Pact intelligence services—even above suppressing domestic dissent. On 19 March 1983, SACEUR General Bernard Rogers delivered a sobering assessment: "We have to deal with the world as we find it. And right now, the Russians have deployed a massive number of warheads—and they are aimed at us." The Soviet Union’s RYAN program (Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie, or "Nuclear Missile Attack") was designed to detect early signs of a Western first strike. But the system was as unstable as the regime it was meant to protect, prone to false alarms and misinterpretations.

Meanwhile, President Ronald Reagan escalated tensions with his 1983 "Evil Empire" speech and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), derisively nicknamed "Star Wars" by critics. The Soviets viewed SDI as a direct threat—a potential shield that could neutralize their nuclear arsenal and embolden the U.S. to launch a preemptive strike. In the summer of 1983, Mikhail Gorbachev—then a rising figure in the Soviet leadership—visited Canada, a trip that foreshadowed his future role in easing Cold War tensions. That same June, former U.S. diplomat Averell Harriman traveled to Moscow as a "private citizen" to meet with Yuri Andropov, the ailing Soviet leader. The visit was an attempt to probe Soviet intentions, but it did little to ease the growing mistrust.

Then, on 1 September 1983, the unthinkable happened: A Soviet Su-15 fighter jet shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, killing all 269 passengers and crew. The brutal act sent shockwaves through the West, reinforcing the perception of the Soviet Union as reckless and aggressive. The paranoia was not one-sided. After Reagan’s 1981 assassination attempt, U.S. officials briefly feared a Soviet attack—a false alarm that underscored how fragile the balance of power had become. Then, on a Sunday morning, 23 October 1983, two truck bombs tore through U.S. and French peacekeeper barracks in Beirut, killing 307 people, including 241 American service members. The attack was a stark reminder of the global instability that could draw superpowers into unintended conflicts. Just days later, the U.S. invaded Grenada, further raising Soviet suspicions of American aggression.

The most dangerous moment came in November 1983 with ABLE ARCHER 83, a NATO military exercise that simulated a nuclear release. The Soviets, already convinced the U.S. was preparing a first strike, misinterpreted the drill as the real thing. On 8 November, Soviet Defence Minister Dmitry Ustinov informed senior officers that U.S. military actions appeared "sufficiently real" to justify raising combat readiness. That same night, Andropov, Ustinov, or both ordered the entire Soviet arsenal—11,000 nuclear warheads—to maximum alert. The world had never been closer to nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis. The full extent of the crisis only became clear years later. A 94-page "Above Top Secret" report, commissioned by President George H.W. Bush in 1990 and declassified in 2015, revealed just how close humanity had come to annihilation. A U.S. Information Security Oversight Office official later called it: "Probably the most interesting document ever to have come across our desks." Robert Gates, then a CIA analyst, reflected on the intelligence failure: "We may have been at the brink of nuclear war—and not even known it."

15. Endgame (1984–1989)

NATO’s steadfast persistence played a critical role in the Soviet Union’s eventual collapse. While the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty reduced nuclear threats, the alliance remained vigilant as the Cold War entered its final, turbulent years. As 1984 began, the world watched as Time magazine named Ronald Reagan and Yuri Andropov its "Men of the Year"—two leaders locked in a high-stakes standoff. That April, U.S. and British officials observed what they described as the largest Soviet naval exercises ever, simulating the same chilling scenario: a conventional Warsaw Pact offensive escalating to nuclear war within a week.

In January 1984, at a disarmament conference in Stockholm, NATO formally presented a six-point proposal aimed at preventing accidental war. But the geopolitical landscape shifted abruptly when Andropov’s death was announced on 9 February, leaving the Soviet Union in uncertain hands. NATO’s new Secretary General, Lord Peter Carrington, took the helm during this pivotal moment. Meanwhile, Britain launched LIONHEART, the largest military exercise of the entire Cold War, while the BBC aired Threads, a harrowing drama depicting the horrors of nuclear war. The message was clear: The balance between deterrence and détente had to be restored.

When Margaret Thatcher met Mikhail Gorbachev in December 1984, she famously told reporters: "We can do business with him." Gorbachev’s rise marked a turning point. By mid-1985, he introduced glasnost (transparency) and perestroika (restructuring), signaling a shift in Soviet policy. Yet, Reagan’s hardline rhetoric persisted, complicating efforts at rapid reconciliation. A breakthrough came when Gorbachev accepted Reagan’s proposal for arms reduction talks, simultaneously announcing a unilateral freeze on SS-20 missile deployments. By the December 1986 NATO summit, the alliance endorsed U.S.–Soviet plans to reduce nuclear arsenals by 50%. However, critics warned that removing missiles could increase the risk of a conventional Soviet invasion of Europe. As Reagan and Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty in December 1987, the first embers of revolution were already smoldering in Eastern Europe.

By 1989, the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe was unraveling. In Poland, the Solidarity movement achieved a historic victory in the nation’s first democratic elections since the 1920s. In a symbolic moment, Czesław Kiszczak—the Communist interior minister who had ordered Lech Wałęsa’s arrest in 1981—publicly shook the Solidarity leader’s hand. In Hungary, the reburial of Imre Nagy and other executed leaders of the 1956 Revolution became a rallying cry for change. On 23 August, two million Baltic citizens formed the "Baltic Chain", joining hands from Tallinn to Riga to Vilnius in the longest human chain in history, a powerful act of defiance against Soviet rule. Meanwhile, protests erupted across East Germany. When Erich Honecker resigned on 18 October, the end was near. Then, on 9 November, a miscommunicated announcement declared that East Germans could cross the border—that night. As jubilant crowds surged toward the Berlin Wall, a NATO officer later recalled: "At headquarters, jaws just dropped." The fall of the Wall sent shockwaves through the Communist world. Thatcher, Mitterrand, and Gorbachev all feared German reunification, but the momentum was unstoppable.

By December, the Czechoslovakian and Bulgarian governments had collapsed; only Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania clung to power—until protesters stormed the streets, and the mob turned on the KGB in Dresden. In a final, desperate stand, a Soviet officer warned protesters: "If you come any further, you will all be shot." The name of that officer was Vladimir Putin. Yet, the tide of history could not be held back. By April 1989, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner declared that the alliance had given Europe its longest period of peace since the Roman Empire. Though Mitterrand and Thatcher believed German reunification was happening too fast, NATO had already committed to supporting it. As 1989 drew to a close, the Cold War’s end was in sight—but the geopolitical landscape would never be the same. 

THE ERA OF INTERVENTION

16. Driving Fast Through Fog (1990–1991)

By late December 1989, Romania’s Nicolae Ceaușescu—one of Europe’s last hardline Communist leaders—faced his reckoning. After thousands of protesters were killed in a violent crackdown, Ceaușescu was forced from power, hunted down, and executed after a summary trial on Christmas Day, 25 December. His fall marked the final collapse of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. As one observer noted: "When military men don’t know what to do, they do what they know."

In 1990, for the first time in history, the professional heads of every military in Europe—35 nations, including the U.S. and Soviet Union (excluding only Albania and Vatican City)—convened to discuss the future of European security. Their most pressing challenge? Preventing the outright collapse of Eastern Europe in the wake of Communist regimes’ fall. During the first six months of 1990, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl ruthlessly pursued reunification, backed by the U.S. and NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner. Kohl ignored the objections of François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher, who feared that a united Germany could destabilize Europe. Thatcher warned: "If Germany became ‘neutral,’ the old Pandora’s box of competition and rivalry in Europe would be reopened." But U.S. President George H.W. Bush was unequivocal: "An American president who wants a Europe whole and free cannot accept the neutralization of a united Germany. There can be no ambiguity." 

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev insisted that any expansion of NATO’s "zone of influence" was unacceptable. He later claimed that U.S. Secretary of State James Baker had assured him: "Not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction." Yet, as East Germany’s future hung in the balance, Gorbachev faced impossible choices. The U.S. planned to close 80 military bases in West Germany—a tenth of its total—but the real stakes were higher. As one official noted: "The crushing of Lithuania would be a problem." To secure Soviet approval for German reunification, the Allies offered key concessions: 

1. Post-war Germany would never develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.
2. All remaining short-range nuclear arms in Germany would be removed entirely.

Still, some warned against treating Russia like a "defeated nation." Wörner reassured Moscow: "NATO has no intention of shifting the balance in Europe to the detriment of the Soviet Union. NATO is a force for peace and European security, in cooperation with the Soviet Union." Thatcher, ever the Cold War hawk, reminded the alliance of nuclear deterrence’s role: "The point of nuclear weapons is to deter—and indeed, they have been very satisfactory in that respect."

On 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, shifting global attention to the Middle East. While NATO’s direct involvement in Operation DESERT STORM was minimal, decades of alliance planning—including REFORGER exercises—enabled the rapid deployment of U.S. and coalition forces. As one general quipped, it was "REFORGER in reverse."

The Soviet Union’s crackdown on its Baltic republics revealed the fragility of Gorbachev’s reforms: On 12 January 1991, Soviet tanks stormed Vilnius, seizing Lithuania’s main TV station just days before the UN deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. Boris Yeltsin, then President of the Russian Republic, emerged as an unexpected ally for Lithuanian independence.On 20 January, Soviet troops violently suppressed Latvian protesters, killing at least five. The Baltic struggles and the Gulf War created new East-West tensions, but they also accelerated the Soviet Union’s unraveling. On 11 February 1991, Iceland—NATO’s smallest member and the only nation to protest joining in 1949—became the first country to recognize Lithuania’s independence. The dominoes were falling. 

On 24 February 1991, as coalition forces launched their ground offensive in the Gulf, the Warsaw Pact—the Soviet-led military alliance—agreed to dissolve by 31 March. The high-tech military machine built to counter Soviet forces in Europe had triumphed in the desert, but the real victory was political. On 29 April 1991, the CIA reported that "all ingredients are now present" for a Kremlin regime change. By summer, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria publicly expressed hopes of joining NATO. In Crimea, Gorbachev found himself under house arrest during the August coup attempt. One by one, Soviet republics—including Ukraine and Georgia—declared independence.

At NATO headquarters, Baltic delegations from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia sought reassurance. Meanwhile, Western support for Ukraine was contingent on its relinquishing nuclear weapons. Then, in a dramatic moment, the Soviet ambassador returned from a phone call with Moscow and delivered stunning news to foreign ministers: "The Soviet Union would cease to exist entirely before the year was out." As Manfred Wörner reflected: "What a whirlwind we are in." With the Soviet Union collapsing, NATO faced existential questions. Sir James Eberle, a former Royal Navy officer, warned: "The role of NATO will have to change. Unless it makes itself useful, it will wither and die." Yet, as Germany and France laid the groundwork for the 1992 Maastricht Treaty—transforming the European Community into the European Union—NATO’s purpose was evolving. The Balkans loomed as the next challenge, and U.S. officials began suggesting NATO’s involvement in the region. The Cold War was over, but the work of securing peace had only just begun. 

17. Into the Balkans (1992–1994)

As the Soviet Union fragmented, Russia and its former republics faced economic freefall, while a far more pressing danger loomed: What would become of the vast Soviet nuclear arsenal? In Poland, military officers warned that without security guarantees, their government might pursue its own nuclear weapons program—a prospect that terrified Western leaders. In a historic shift, NATO’s maritime operation—renamed from MARITIME MONITOR to MARITIME GUARD—received unprecedented authorization to fire warning shots and board non-compliant ships. This was the first time in NATO’s history that its forces were empowered to use such measures, signaling a new era of assertive action. By February 1993, the new Clinton administration began publicly considering humanitarian aid drops—a potential precursor to deeper involvement in global crises.

Lech Wałęsa, Poland’s former Solidarity leader and president, issued a stark warning: "If Russia again adopts an aggressive foreign policy, that aggression will be directed toward Ukraine and Poland." Western leaders saw NATO membership as the "ultimate carrot" to promote democracy and ensure Ukrainian denuclearization. The stakes were high: Ukraine possessed the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, and its disarmament was a top priority for global security. In October 1993, a secret letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to Clinton, British Prime Minister John Major, Mitterrand, and Kohl was leaked to the public. The letter expressed Russia’s firm opposition to NATO’s eastward expansion, framing it as a direct threat to Russian security. Meanwhile, Germany—now reunified but geographically exposed—pushed for further NATO enlargement to its eastern flank, fearing future Russian aggression. NATO’s 45th year proved pivotal. The alliance firmly set its course toward eastward expansion, but mutual distrust between Russia and the West was resurging. Disturbing reports emerged that Russia had resumed its Cold War-era biological weapons program, violating international agreements and raising alarms about its military intentions.

In February 1994, the Bosnian Serbs finally pushed NATO and the West to their limits. After years of hesitation, the alliance’s patience snapped—but not before one last provocation. On 28 February, Bosnian Serbs defied international demands, forcing NATO to confront the reality that diplomacy alone could no longer contain the crisis. The sudden death of NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner in 1994 left the alliance in a moment of transition. His successor, Willy Claes, took office in October, inheriting an organization facing its greatest tests since the Cold War. On 5 December 1994, Ukraine signed the Budapest Memorandum, relinquishing its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, Britain, France, and Germany. The agreement was hailed as a diplomatic triumph—but within a week, Russia launched its first post-Soviet military offensive against separatists in Chechnya. The contradiction was stark: While Ukraine disarmed, Russia rearmed.

As 1994 drew to a close, NATO stood at a crossroads: Expansion was now inevitable, but Russia’s resistance was growing louder. The Balkans demanded urgent action, while new threats—from biological weapons to regional conflicts—tested the alliance’s resolve. The lessons of history were clear, but the path forward remained unpredictable. One thing was certain: NATO could no longer afford to be a passive observer in a rapidly changing world. 

18. Where Angels Fear to Tread (1995–1998)

The Dayton Accords (1995) ended the Bosnian War, but NATO’s role in Kosovo (1999) tested its unity. The U.S. led a 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia without UN approval, sparking debates over legality and sovereignty.

On 25 May 1995, NATO jets launched their first airstrikes of the year, marking a decisive shift from peacekeeping to combat. The alliance was no longer a passive observer—it was now an active force in the Balkan crisis. The tragedy of Srebrenica unfolded on 6 July 1995, as Bosnian Serb forces overran the UN "safe area", committing genocide against 8,000 Bosnian Muslims. The massacre galvanized NATO into action. In a dramatic show of force, the U.S. aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt steamed over 900 miles in 24 hours, joining the French carrier Foch and allied aircraft in NATO’s first true test of coordinated military power.

On 1 November 1995, the warring factions gathered at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, for intensive peace talks. The result was a landmark agreement—but enforcing it would require unprecedented commitment. NATO established IFOR (Implementation Force), its first-ever operational ground mission, with 60,000 troops deployed by Christmas 1995. The mission was clear: Secure the peace and prevent further bloodshed. Under Secretary General Javier Solana, NATO embarked on its most ambitious expansion since the Cold War. At the July 1997 Madrid Summit, Solana proclaimed the formal invitation of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join the alliance. 

The first wave of admissions was limited but symbolic, signaling NATO’s shift eastward. To ease Russian concerns, the U.S. made key concessions, including Russia’s admission to the G7—now the G8—and the NATO–Russia Founding Act, which gave Moscow a "voice, but not a veto" in NATO decisions. On 16 January 1998, the Clinton administration and the three Baltic states signed a formal charter, explicitly supporting Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian membership in NATO. The move was a strategic counter to Russian influence in the region.

In February 1998, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević ordered a brutal police crackdown in Kosovo, targeting ethnic Albanian civilians. By September, the humanitarian crisis had escalated, hundreds were dead, nearly 250,000 Kosovars were displaced. The UN Security Council responded with Resolution 1199, condemning Yugoslavia’s actions and demanding the withdrawal of security forces used for civilian repression.

As 1999 approached, the geopolitical landscape was shifting rapidly. In March 1999, Vladimir Putin was sworn in as director of Russia’s Security Council—a harbinger of a new era in Russian foreign policy. NATO stood at the brink of another intervention, this time in Kosovo, as the Balkan powder keg threatened to ignite once more. 

19. Kosovo (1999)

NATO’s intervention in Kosovo demonstrated its willingness to act outside its traditional defense mandate. The campaign succeeded in halting Serbian aggression but strained relations with Russia and some European allies.

As March 1999 began, an eerie sense of history repeating itself gripped NATO. The alliance’s experience in Bosnia seemed to be playing out again in Kosovo—but this time, the stakes were even higher. On 12 March 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary formally signed their accession to the North Atlantic Treaty, marking NATO’s first post-Cold War expansion. Yet, none of the three militaries fully met NATO’s operational standards—a gambit on the alliance’s future strength. Meanwhile, NATO reassured Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Romania that military action against them would be "unacceptable"—a diplomatic balancing act as the Kosovo crisis escalated.

NATO’s rudimentary website became an unexpected battleground. By early April, its daily hits surged to 90,000—three times its pre-war average—before crashing under a flood of emails and a Directed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. This cyber assault, among the first of its kind in modern warfare, exposed the vulnerabilities of digital-age conflict. On the ground, airpower’s limitations became painfully clear. USAF General Richard Hawley admitted:"Airpower works best when it is used decisively. Clearly, because of the constraints in this operation, we haven’t seen that at this point." The problem of civilian casualties only intensified, eroding public support and testing NATO’s resolve.

Senator John McCain issued a stark warning to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "If we do not achieve our goals in Kosovo, NATO is finished as an alliance." The turning point came on 21 April, when cruise missiles struck downtown Belgrade, escalating the conflict. By late April, the factors that would ultimately end the war were falling into place:

1. Intensifying NATO bombardment.
2. Growing economic pressure on Serbia.
3. The mounting threat of ground troops.
4. Russian-backed negotiations gaining traction.

Yet, the war took a dark and unexpected turn on 7 May, when U.S. bombs mistakenly hit the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three journalists and sparking international outrage. For Kosovan refugees, life was becoming increasingly miserable. On 27 May, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen held a clandestine meeting in Cologne with his British, French, German, and Italian counterparts. After six and a half hours of debate, they concluded: NATO had days to decide whether to deploy ground troops—or risk losing the war. Meanwhile, Russia offered to join the Kosovo peacekeeping mission—but only on its own terms, outside NATO command. NATO rejected the idea of a "separate sector" for Russian forces, setting the stage for a high-stakes confrontation.

In the early hours of 11 June, a Russian armored column—ostensibly peacekeepers assigned to NATO’s SFOR mission in Bosnia—crossed into Serbia and headed for Pristina airport. What followed was, in the words of one observer, "a crazy seventy-two hours of zigzags, lies, high-level confusion, and confrontation." By the time NATO troops were scheduled to enter Kosovo in the early hours of 12 June, the Russians were already there. Upon arriving at Pristina airport on the evening of 11 June, Russian forces secured the bunker first—a strategic power play. At 5 a.m., NATO Supreme Commander Wesley Clark ordered British General Mike Jackson to "reach the airport as quickly as possible and co-occupy it with the Russians." When Jackson hesitated, Clark issued an ultimatum: "Mike, do you understand that as a NATO commander, I’m giving you a legal order? If you don’t accept that, you will have to resign your position and get out of the chain of command. I want it done. Is that clear?" Jackson replied that he did—but the tension remained. As the Kosovo crisis reached its climax, Vladimir Putin—appointed chair of Russia’s National Security Council in March 1999—was watching closely. The Pristina standoff foreshadowed the new era of great-power competition that would define the 21st century. 

20. Into a New Century (1999–2001)

By 20 June 1999, NATO forces had secured control of every major city in Kosovo—except for Mitrovica, where Serbian hardliners declared their neighborhood a "Serbian zone", defying the alliance’s authority. In June 1999, Javier Solana left NATO to become Secretary General of the EU Council. His replacement was British Defence Secretary George Robertson, a seasoned politician tasked with navigating the alliance’s post-war challenges. General Mike Jackson’s leadership during the Kosovo campaign earned him widespread respect, and his successor as KFOR commander, German General Klaus Reinhardt, was equally well-regarded. Yet, distrust of Russian forces persisted among NATO troops, complicating peacekeeping efforts. Meanwhile, Russia’s aggressive resurgence was on full display in Chechnya, where Moscow launched a brutal new offensive, ignoring international condemnation.

The alliance found itself in a "lose-lose" situation, as one analyst noted: "If NATO gets tough, Milošević can portray the Serbs as victims. If NATO shrinks from action, the situation only gets worse." The political fallout from Kosovo deepened transatlantic divisions. As the 2000 U.S. presidential election unfolded—with George W. Bush and Al Gore locked in a too-close-to-call race—pollsters highlighted a growing rift between U.S. and European opinions, exacerbated by the war.

In 2001, Slobodan Milošević became the first 21st-century leader forced from power by popular revolt. He was handed over to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, where he faced charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. His co-accused, Momčilo Krajišnik, would later be convicted for his role in ethnic cleansing. Yet, the Balkans remained unstable. Montenegro moved toward independence, while Macedonia faced an insurgency from ethnic Albanian rebels. In June 2001, the Macedonian government—desperate for support—allowed a small NATO team into the country. The mission, Operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST, was not UN-mandated but conducted at Skopje’s invitation, marking a new model of NATO intervention. As one official observed: "Here is a situation where the Europeans have the will—and the capability."  

The Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—intensified their push for NATO membership, finding a powerful ally in the Bush administration. But when Bush met Vladimir Putin for the first time in Slovenia (June 2001), the Russian leader delivered a blunt warning: "Do not act unilaterally on missile defense or NATO expansion." Putin’s assertive stance signaled that Russia would not accept NATO’s eastward growth without a fight.

For years, post-Cold War NATO had struggled to define its role. That changed dramatically on 11 September 2001, when the 9/11 attacks triggered Article 5 for the first time in history. The alliance united against terrorism, leading to its first major out-of-area operation: the invasion of Afghanistan. The new global threat had given NATO a renewed sense of purpose—but it also set the stage for future conflicts over strategy, burden-sharing, and the alliance’s very identity.

21. 9/11 and Its Aftermath (2001)

NATO’s invocation of Article 5 after 9/11 symbolized its solidarity with the U.S. The alliance deployed forces to Afghanistan, but the mission became protracted and divisive, exposing gaps in military capabilities and political will.

At 3:03 p.m. in Brussels, as the second plane struck the World Trade Center, the world watched in horror. President George W. Bush, reading to second graders in Florida, received the news from White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card. His reaction was immediate and resolute: "They have declared war on us." But who was "they"? In Brussels, NATO Secretary General George Robertson was already determined: If the U.S. was going to fight, NATO would stand with it. More than two decades later, NATO’s decision to invoke Article 5 remains a pivotal moment—both for the alliance’s history and for transatlantic relations. While the U.S. welcomed the political unity of the declaration, some dismissed NATO’s military contribution as limited. Yet, the attack forged a new global coalition. Two leaders, in particular, stepped forward to support Bush: British Prime Minister Tony Blair and, surprisingly, Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The U.S. response was swift and unconventional. Clandestine CIA operators and special forces were deployed to Afghanistan, where they supercharged the Northern Alliance—a ragtag group of 20,000 anti-Taliban fighters. By late September, the CIA team (codenamed JAWBREAKER) was on the ground, sharing classified maps and delivering $1 million in cash to bolster the resistance. The strategy worked. By 13 November—just nine weeks after 9/11—the Taliban appeared to abandon Kabul, marking the beginning of the end for their brutal regime. As the Afghan campaign unfolded, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns outlined the alliance’s shifting priorities: 

• The Balkans—still simmering with instability—remained the top concern.
• A "new relationship" with Russia, as Putin offered unexpected cooperation.
• Expanding NATO to consolidate democracy in Eastern and Southern Europe.

Yet, tensions simmered within the Bush administration. The clash between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell over U.S. foreign policy threatened to undermine unity. Meanwhile, the U.S. took controversial steps, including opening a prison camp at Guantánamo Bay—a move that would later haunt its global reputation. 

On 5 December 2001, the Bonn Agreement established a new Afghan government under Hamid Karzai. The deal was a diplomatic triumph, but the challenges ahead were daunting. For NATO, the post-9/11 world had redrawn the map of global security. The alliance was no longer focused solely on Europe—it was now entangled in a war with no clear end in sight.  

22. The Schisms of Iraq (2002–2005)

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq (2003) split NATO, with France and Germany opposing the war. The episode highlighted transatlantic rifts but also led to reforms, such as the NATO Response Force (2003). As NATO expanded, new tensions emerged. The November 2002 Prague Summit was meant to celebrate the alliance’s growth—welcoming the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—while isolating Ukraine over allegations of arms sales to Saddam Hussein. Yet, beneath the surface, cracks were forming. Anti-American sentiment surged in Europe, complicating NATO’s stance on Iraq. When the U.S. pushed for military assistance to protect Turkey, a French-German-Belgian veto blocked the measure, exposing deep divisions. Secretary General George Robertson, nearing the end of his tenure, warned that Iraq was tearing NATO apart.

Meanwhile, Germany, France, and Belgium—joined by Russia—issued a joint statement calling for intensified weapons inspections as an alternative to war. This Moscow-Paris-Berlin axis foreshadowed Vladimir Putin’s future diplomatic strategies. Yet, as Robertson noted, Afghanistan remained a rare point of unity: "While Iraq almost broke NATO, we could still find common ground in Afghanistan." 

On 19 March 2003, the U.S. launched its first strikes against Iraq—without NATO’s backing. Still, Polish special forces stood shoulder-to-shoulder with U.S. Navy SEALs, seizing key oil platforms in the Persian Gulf. The U.S.-led Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan remained separate from NATO’s ISAF mission in Kabul. But on 11 August 2003, NATO formally took over ISAF, marking its first major out-of-area operation. As one official admitted: "NATO found itself pulled into Afghanistan because no one else was able to take charge in Kabul." Robertson, in his final speech, struck a cautious but optimistic tone about Russia: "We will not always agree with Russia politically. But not even the most imaginative Hollywood screenwriter can daydream up a scenario where NATO and Russia return to Cold War hostility."

In February 2004, NATO agreed to secure the Athens Olympics, signaling a new focus on counterterrorism. That same year, the U.S. and Norwegian delegations proposed a summit on human trafficking, hinting at NATO’s potential role in combating cross-border crime. But terrorism struck closer to home. On 11 March 2004, just days before Spain’s election, bombs tore through Madrid’s commuter trains, killing 191 and wounding over 1,800. The attack shocked Europe and reshaped political landscapes.

• On 29 March 2004, President Bush welcomed the leaders of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to the White House, celebrating their NATO membership. The Baltic states, fearing Russian aggression, requested NATO fighter patrols to defend their airspace—a mission dubbed "air policing." Elsewhere, pro-Western revolutions swept the former Soviet sphere: 
• The 2003 "Rose Revolution" in Georgia saw protesters led by Mikheil Saakashvili ouster Eduard Shevardnadze, waving red roses as a symbol of change.
• In Ukraine, however, President Leonid Kuchma stunned the nation in July 2004 by abandoning NATO and EU aspirations.
• Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, Moscow’s favored candidate, was poised to win the 2004 election—until opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned with dioxin in a chilling assassination attempt.
• The 2005 "Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan further highlighted the region’s instability.

The battle for democracy in Eastern Europe was far from over—and NATO’s role in shaping its future had never been more critical.

23. Afghanistan: NATO’s Longest War (2006–2010)

NATO’s Afghanistan mission became a test of endurance. Despite initial successes, insurgent resurgence and allied fatigue undermined the campaign, culminating in a chaotic withdrawal in 2021.

Afghanistan was supposed to be NATO’s moment of unity—but it became its greatest challenge. The rivalries and confusion that plagued the alliance in the Balkans were amplified in the rugged mountains and volatile cities of Afghanistan. By 2006, the situation was deteriorating. Brigadier David Richards (later General Sir David Richards), the new ISAF commander, faced a daunting task: His forces would report to NATO’s leadership, while the U.S. ran its own parallel operation, ENDURING FREEDOM. The divided command structure created confusion, friction, and inefficiency. When SACEUR General James Jones confronted Richards over a Guardian interview describing Afghanistan as an "anarchy", the message was clear: NATO’s civilian and military leaders were deeply frustrated.

At first, 2006 seemed relatively calm. NATO had 20,000 non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan, while the U.S. deployed another 21,000—some under NATO command, others answering only to American officers. But the illusion of progress was short-lived. By March 2007, ISAF launched its largest offensive yet, only to see conflict spread across the country. The Taliban’s resilience was summed up in a chilling remark attributed to their leaders: "You may have the watches, but we have the time." A British officer echoed the sentiment: "Time in Afghanistan is measured in decades, not months or years."

By summer 2008, General David McKiernan commanded 65,000 troops from 39 nations—yet the war was going from bad to worse. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted to Congress: "I’m not sure we’re winning." The costs were mounting. In September 2008, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced his country would withdraw from Kandahar by 2011, signaling growing war-weariness among NATO members.

2009 brought a new U.S. president—Barack Obama—and a new commander: General Stanley McChrystal, a legendary but controversial figure. At NATO’s Strasbourg summit in April 2009, leaders reaffirmed their commitment, but private doubts lingered. As one official admitted: "We’re not here because we want to be, but we are all looking to get out." NATO’s 2010 southern Afghanistan offensive, Operation MOSHTARAK, was supposed to turn the tide. Instead, it exposed deeper problems. 

Then, in summer 2010, McChrystal’s team—dubbed "Team America"—self-destructed. A Rolling Stone article by Michael Hastings quoted McChrystal and his aides mocking U.S. officials in brutally candid terms. Within days, McChrystal was fired, replaced by General David Petraeus, a man known for his political savvy and counterinsurgency expertise. The war in Afghanistan had become not just a military struggle, but a test of NATO’s cohesion—and its will to endure.

RENEWED CONFRONTATION

24. Putin, Pirates, Cyber Attacks, and Georgia (2007–2011)

Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia and cyber attacks on Estonia signaled a return to great-power competition. NATO responded by enhancing cyber defenses and reinforcing Eastern Europe.

At the February 2007 Munich Security Conference, Vladimir Putin hijacked the agenda, delivering a blistering attack on NATO expansion and U.S. missile defense plans. His aggressive rhetoric marked a sharp escalation in Russia-West tensions and set the stage for years of confrontation. When NATO foreign ministers gathered in Oslo on 26 April 2007, Russia announced it would suspend compliance with a key arms treaty. The warning shot was just the beginning. Days later, violence erupted in Tallinn, Estonia’s capital, after pro-Russian protesters clashed with police over the relocation of a Soviet war memorial. The unrest was followed by a wave of cyberattacks—desecrating government websites and crippling infrastructure—in what many called the first act of state-sponsored "cyber warfare."

In August 2008, as the world’s attention was on the opening of the Beijing Olympics, Russia invaded Georgia, targeting the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The five-day war ended with Georgia’s NATO aspirations in tatters. As one analyst put it: "Russia has successfully burnt Georgia’s NATO card." The conflict exposed NATO’s divisions. While the Bush administration pushed for fast-track membership for Georgia and Ukraine, European allies hesitated, fearing further provocation. Putin had already declared that their NATO membership would be a "direct threat" to Russia, even questioning Ukraine’s sovereignty and claiming Crimea’s population was "actually Russian."

The global financial crisis of 2008 added another layer of instability. Just two days before NATO defense ministers met in London (17 September), the collapse of Lehman Brothers sent shockwaves through the world economy. Iceland, on the brink of bankruptcy, turned to Russia for a bailout—only for the UK to block its banks from repatriating assets. By October 2008, Iceland was forced into IMF negotiations, and by November, it was clear: Russia’s promised bailout would never come. The Kremlin’s influence had its limits. Yet, the crisis reinforced fears in Eastern and Central Europe. After Georgia, officials warned that Russia’s aggression was far from over. When Moscow launched major ZAPAD military exercises in late 2009, critics described NATO’s response as weak.

In the 2010s, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s new Secretary General and a self-described "reformer," sought to modernize the alliance. He appointed Madeleine Albright to lead a panel of experts in crafting NATO’s first new strategic concept since the Cold War. The goal: Define alliance priorities and project NATO’s global role—while keeping Russia as a partner, not a foe. In April 2010, Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a new nuclear arms control agreement, a rare moment of cooperation. But tensions persisted. NATO also expanded its missions, launching Operation OCEAN SHIELD in August 2009 to combat Somali piracy—a seven-year commitment to protect civilian shipping.

In June 2010, the FBI uncovered a Kremlin-controlled spy ring operating in the U.S., a throwback to Cold War-era espionage. Yet, diplomacy continued. Russia agreed to allow more NATO supplies to transit through its territory into Afghanistan—a small but significant concession. But trust remained fragile. The April 2010 plane crash that killed Polish President Lech Kaczyński in Russia deepened suspicions, fueling conspiracy theories and further straining relations.

25. Unexpected Revolutions (2011–2013)

The Arab Spring and Libya intervention (2011) showed NATO’s adaptability but also its limits. The mission in Libya succeeded in toppling Gaddafi but left a power vacuum, while Syria’s civil war exposed the alliance’s reluctance to intervene without clear objectives.

By the early 2010s, NATO was spread dangerously thin. Afghanistan, Iraq, and the counter-piracy mission in the Indian Ocean were draining resources, leaving many allies reluctant to take on new challenges. Yet, as the alliance grappled with existing conflicts, a new crisis erupted—this time in North Africa. In February 2011, protests in Libya against Muammar Gaddafi escalated into brutal violence, dwarfing the unrest seen elsewhere in the Arab Spring. The international community watched in horror as Gaddafi threatened to crush dissent with military force. On 26 February, Italy suspended its 2008 treaty with Libya, under which Tripoli had agreed to limit Mediterranean migration in exchange for a "non-aggression pact" with Rome. The move signaled a shifting stance—and set the stage for international intervention. When the UN Security Council authorized "all necessary measures" to protect civilians, NATO faced a critical decision. Russia, wary of Western regime-change operations, feared Libya could set a precedent. As one Kremlin insider later revealed, Putin was determined to "nip it in the bud"—before intervention became a habit.

As NATO debated its response to Libya, Russia sent a message of its own. During the ZAPAD 2013 exercises, Moscow claimed only 10,000 troops were involved. Independent analysts, however, estimated the real number exceeded 70,000—a massive show of force along NATO’s eastern flank. NATO countered with STEADFAST JAZZ, its largest post-Cold War drill, launching in November 2013. With 6,000 troops, the exercise tested the NATO Response Force’s ability to deploy rapidly to any global crisis. The subtext was clear: The alliance was preparing for a new era of uncertainty—one where rapid reaction could mean the difference between stability and chaos.

26. The Return of War to Europe (2012–2015)

Russia’s annexation of Crimea (2014) and support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine forced NATO to refocus on collective defense. The alliance deployed battle groups to the Baltics and Poland, marking a return to Cold War-era deterrence.

As Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine moved to sign landmark deals with the European Union, Moscow watched with alarm. The Kremlin was determined to block what it saw as Western encroachment on its traditional sphere of influence. In Ukraine, President Viktor Yanukovych faced a deepening crisis. Some feared he might attempt to split the country, pitting the pro-European west against the Russian-speaking east. But Putin had other plans. On the night of 21 February 2014, Russian forces executed a daring and swift operation: Special units "rescued" Yanukovych, spiriting him into Russia. Military actions began to seize control of Crimea. British General Richard Shirreff, then Deputy SACEUR, later admitted: "Crimea came out of a clear blue sky. It was a hugely professional operation. There was no intelligence warning." By 16 March, Crimean authorities—under Russian direction—held a referendum. Official results claimed over 80% of voters supported leaving Ukraine to join the Russian Federation. The international community condemned the move as a flagrant violation of sovereignty, but the fait accompli was impossible to reverse.

As NATO grappled with Russia’s aggression, another crisis demanded global focus. ISIS forces were sweeping across Iraq and Syria, seizing vast territories and committing atrocities. The U.S., already stretched thin, found its attention pulled away from Europe—just as Putin had calculated. Yet, Russia’s long-term prospects were far from secure. Demographic trends—an aging population, plummeting birth rates, and an economy overly dependent on energy—suggested that even without Western pressure, the Kremlin’s grip on power could unravel over time.

At the 4 September 2014 NATO summit in Newport, Wales, leaders gathered to strategize—and to welcome Jens Stoltenberg as the new Secretary General. The alliance knew it had to act. Later that month, STEADFAST JAVELIN 2—NATO’s largest Baltic drills since the Cold War—kicked off. 2,000 troops from nine nations conducted exercises across the Baltics, Poland, and Germany, sending a clear message of deterrence to Moscow. But NATO’s strengths had limits. As one analyst noted: "NATO is excellent at responding to overt military aggression—but struggles with the subtler ways Russia applies pressure." 

By late September 2014, Russia escalated further, launching missile strikes from warships and aircraft to shore up Syria’s Assad regime. The move deepened Moscow’s influence in the Middle East—and further complicated NATO’s strategic calculus. Amid the chaos, a European official lamented: "The EU can no longer adequately respond to Russia’s power plays. At least the U.S. is finally stepping up." Yet, with America’s focus divided between ISIS, Ukraine, and global terrorism, Europe’s security hung in an uncertain balance.

27. Enter Donald Trump (2016–2019)

President Trump’s criticism of NATO as "obsolete" and demands for increased defense spending strained transatlantic relations. Despite his rhetoric, NATO adapted by increasing burden-sharing and expanding its presence in Eastern Europe.

The core principle of NATO had always been "solidarity among allies"—a lesson hard-won from two world wars. As British leaders advocated for a "strong UK in a strong Europe," Donald Trump took a far more transactional view. He repeatedly threatened that the U.S. might abandon allies who failed to "pay their bills." Yet, the reality was undeniable: The U.S. accounted for 70% of NATO’s military spending. While Trump’s frustration over uneven burden-sharing was understandable, his blunt ultimatums risked undermining the alliance’s cohesion. As one official reminded him: "The only time Article 5 was ever invoked was after 9/11—when New York, your hometown, was attacked." Trump’s message to Europe was clear—and crude: "Pay up or be [expletive]."  

From summer 2015 onward, the U.S. National Security Agency detected Russian digital intrusions targeting voter registration systems—a harbinger of election interference to come. Meanwhile, NATO’s eastern flank was bracing for conflict. Baltic states doubled their arms purchases after 2014, but concerns persisted. Lieutenant General Richard Shirreff, a former Deputy SACEUR, even wrote a speculative novel—War with Russia—warning that NATO was unprepared to defend against a Russian offensive. The alliance’s cyber defenses were put to the test in Estonia, where the LOCKED SHIELDS exercise—run by NATO’s new cyber center—garnered global attention. Elsewhere, disinformation campaigns spread false rumors, like the alleged rape of a Lithuanian schoolgirl by a German soldier, deliberately sowing division. As one analyst noted: "This was a clear example of information being weaponized."

Trump’s first visit to Europe in April 2017—for the opening of NATO’s new Brussels headquarters—was overshadowed by his demands for higher defense spending. Yet, behind the scenes, even hawks like Defense Secretary Jim Mattis agreed with Trump’s push for greater European contributions—while insisting the alliance remained vital. That July, 24 nations participated in SABRE GUARDIAN, the largest NATO drills in years, with 35,000 troops across Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria. But Russia responded in kind. In August 2017, the Kremlin launched massive exercises, claiming 13,000 troops were involved. NATO estimated the real number was closer to 100,000.

By 2018, Trump’s pressure was yielding results: Eight NATO members now spent over 2% of GDP on defense—double the number from when he took office. The U.S. boosted its European military budget to $6.5 billion—twice the Obama-era level. Yet, turmoil within the administration undermined stability. In March 2018, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson learned of his firing via Twitter, replaced by CIA Director Mike Pompeo. That October, NATO staged TRIDENT JUNCTURE—its largest Cold War-era drill—with 50,000 personnel, 10,000 vehicles, 250 aircraft, and 65 ships. The exercise proved NATO could rapidly deploy to vulnerable areas near Russia—and showcased new cooperation with Sweden and Finland, non-member states increasingly aligned with the alliance. But cracks were showing. In December 2018, Jim Mattis resigned, reportedly disturbed by Trump’s impulsive foreign policy—including private threats to leave NATO entirely.

In January 2019, the U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, escalating tensions with Russia. Yet, Trump’s relationship with Stoltenberg remained surprisingly strong. At an April 2019 meeting, he praised the Secretary General: "The relationship has been outstanding." But transatlantic unity was fraying. In November 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron declared NATO "brain dead," prompting a rare rebuke from Angela Merkel. Trump fired back, calling Macron’s remarks "very insulting." As 2019 began, NATO faced a paradox: 

• Military spending was up.
• U.S. commitment was in question.
• Europe’s security depended on an alliance under strain.

28. The World Crisis of the 2020s

Just three days into January 2020, President Trump ordered a drone strike that killed Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander Qasem Soleimani as his convoy passed through Baghdad International Airport. The assassination marked a dramatic escalation in tensions, but it was far from the only challenge facing the U.S. and its allies. By then, America’s longest war—the conflict in Afghanistan—had stretched on for eighteen years. Soldiers who had been born after 9/11 now found themselves deployed in the same war as their fathers. Since 2001, the U.S. had spent over $132 billion on reconstruction in Afghanistan—more than the cost of rebuilding Europe after World War II.

In early February, the U.S. began its largest troop deployment to Europe since the Cold War-era REFORGER exercises, with plans to send 20,000 personnel alongside tanks and vehicles. But as the movement of forces got underway, international health officials issued stark warnings: the Covid-19 outbreak—then described as an "influenza" raging in Wuhan, China—threatened to become a global pandemic. The crisis hit NATO directly. On March 7, a U.S. Navy sailor based in Naples tested positive, the first confirmed case among American service members. The Pentagon responded by canceling or scaling back major exercises, including DEFENDER Europe 20—a move that underscored the pandemic’s immediate impact on military readiness. By March 18, NATO ambassadors gathered in a nearly empty chamber to address the unfolding crisis. The next day, Belgium, France, Spain, and Italy imposed total lockdowns, bringing Europe to a standstill.

Amid the chaos, Russian military convoys rolled through Italy, emblazoned with the slogan "From Russia with Love." The spectacle sent a chilling message. As one NATO diplomat admitted, "This is a big success story for Putin." The pandemic’s devastation became undeniable. By the end of 2020, the World Health Organization estimated over three million deaths worldwide. A later analysis revised that number upward, suggesting nearly 15 million excess deaths in 2020 and 2021—though the exact toll, whether from the virus itself or the consequences of lockdowns, remains uncertain. Economically, the European Union’s GDP plummeted by over 6%, a sharper decline than during the 2008 financial crisis.

Within days of NATO’s March 2021 ministerial meeting, Russia launched its first major military mobilization along Ukraine’s borders. Eastern and Central European nations viewed the move as a deliberate provocation—a test of the new Biden administration’s resolve. When Biden and Putin met in Geneva that June, the summit was notably subdued. The two leaders delivered brief remarks before retiring for closed-door talks, emerging only to hold separate press conferences—a reflection of the frosty relations between Washington and Moscow.

On August 15, 2021, Taliban forces reached the outskirts of Kabul. The U.S. acting ambassador ordered the evacuation of the American mission, signaling the imminent collapse of Afghanistan’s government. Within days, chaos engulfed the city. Over two decades of war, NATO allies had lost 3,812 personnel in Afghanistan, including 2,461 Americans. In the final, frantic days, 13 U.S. soldiers were killed in a suicide bombing at Kabul’s airport. Then, in the early hours of August 30, the last U.S. flight departed, ending America’s longest war—but leaving behind a propaganda victory for the Taliban and a dangerous precedent. To adversaries like Taiwan and Ukraine, the message was clear: American commitments were not guaranteed.

As the year drew to a close, tensions with Russia escalated further. Moscow placed its nuclear deterrence forces on high alert and conducted large-scale ZAPAD military drills, a show of force that alarmed NATO. Some analysts warned that Russia might even withdraw from the Cold War-era "nuclear sharing" agreement, which allowed U.S. atomic weapons to be stored in NATO states for collective defense—a system established under President Eisenhower and SACEUR Lauris Norstad.

2024: THE ROAD TO 2049

29. From Vilnius to Washington (2023–2024)

The 2023 NATO Vilnius Summit marked a pivotal moment for the alliance, addressing two critical issues: Ukraine’s potential membership and the need for long-term deterrence against Russia. The summit also highlighted the challenges ahead, particularly the delicate balance between U.S. and European strategic priorities. NATO introduced three new regional defense plans, each led by a dedicated command:

1. The High North and Atlantic, coordinated by NATO’s Joint Force Command in Norfolk, Virginia.
2. The Baltic to the Alps, overseen by Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum in the Netherlands (currently under Italian leadership). This region is considered the most likely flashpoint in any potential crisis.
3. Southeastern Europe, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, commanded by the headquarters in Naples.

Notably, the northern and Mediterranean plans were supervised by senior U.S. naval officers, reflecting a return to Cold War-era command structures. The alliance continues to adapt to modern threats across its five domains of warfare: land, sea, air, space, and cyber. As Military Committee Chairman Admiral Rob Bauer emphasized, the focus remains on preventing escalation—a sentiment echoed by former U.S. President Donald Trump, who once vowed to "finish the process of fundamentally re-evaluating NATO’s purpose and mission."

NATO’s eastern members took unprecedented steps to bolster security. For the first time, countries on the alliance’s eastern flank engaged in bilateral negotiations with major European states and Canada to secure troop deployments—a departure from traditional NATO procedures. 

Key developments included:

• Germany’s commitment to permanently station up to 4,000 troops in Lithuania, announced jointly by the Vilnius and Berlin governments.
• Canada’s expansion of its leadership role in the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battlegroup in Latvia.

These moves came amid growing concerns over Russian aggression, including:

1. The threat of a land corridor from Belarus to Kaliningrad, which would encircle the Suwałki Gap—a critical NATO vulnerability.
2. Lithuania’s GRIFFIN STORM military exercises, designed to enhance readiness against potential incursions.
3. Reports of the Wagner Group coercing recruits into signing contracts to fight in Poland and Lithuania, should orders be given.

Tensions intensified as Russian officials warned that any Ukrainian advance into territory Moscow considers Russian would leave "no other way out" but nuclear retaliation. Meanwhile, attacks crept closer to NATO’s borders, raising fears of direct confrontation. 

30. Surviving the NATO Century (2024–2049)

Three potential reasons for not celebrating its 100th anniversary: 

1. NATO has collapsed.
2. It has been superseded by something else.
3. It has finally failed to stop a catastrophic war.

En 2023, un informe del Congreso de Estados Unidos advirtió que el país se enfrenta a un punto de inflexión histórico: por primera vez, podría tener dos adversarios nucleares con capacidad de igual a igual —Rusia y China—, ambos dispuestos a alterar el orden internacional mediante el uso de la fuerza si fuera necesario. Este contexto ha impulsado a las potencias occidentales a revisar sus estrategias de defensa y disuasión. En el verano de 2023, la Armada de EE.UU. llevó a cabo su mayor simulación global de conflicto en décadas, un ejercicio que abarcó escenarios hipotéticos en el Atlántico, el Pacífico, el Mediterráneo y el Ártico. Este tipo de simulaciones refleja la preocupación por un posible conflicto a gran escala que involucre a Rusia y China. Por su parte, la OTAN realizó en octubre de 2023 el ejercicio STEADFAST JUPITER, el mayor de su tipo en décadas. Los planificadores reconocieron que el escenario tuvo que actualizarse repetidamente para mantenerse al día con los eventos reales, como la invasión de Ucrania, la guerra en Gaza y la creciente tensión en el Indo-Pacífico. Además, se confirmó el regreso de armas nucleares estadounidenses a Reino Unido tras su salida en el año 2000. Francia, por su parte, desplegó simultáneamente tres de sus cuatro submarinos de misiles balísticos para demostrar su capacidad de respuesta en tiempos de guerra. 

El debate estratégico actual enfrenta una falsa dicotomía: por un lado, la apuesta por tecnologías avanzadas, como drones operados por inteligencia artificial; por otro, la necesidad de mantener capacidades tradicionales, como artillería, tanques y tropas. Iniciativas como DIANA (Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic) buscan acelerar la innovación, pero sin descuidar la importancia de las fuerzas convencionales. La alianza ha ampliado su alcance estratégico. En 2021, su cumbre incluyó una cláusula que considera un ataque a la infraestructura espacial de un miembro como posible detonante del Artículo 5. Además, países como Suecia y Finlandia, recién incorporados, se encuentran entre los mejor preparados para enfrentar los desafíos actuales. Sin embargo, la relación entre Moscú y Pekín sigue siendo impredecible. Mientras Rusia sufre pérdidas en Ucrania —que deberá reponer en el futuro—, China observa de cerca el desarrollo de los conflictos, especialmente en el Indo-Pacífico. Algunos analistas, como el general Mick Ryan de Australia, destacan que "más allá de Europa, nuestros adversarios están atentos". 

La historia de la OTAN ha sido siempre impredecible. En sus primeros años, figuras como el general Dwight D. Eisenhower —primer Comandante Supremo Aliado en Europa (SACEUR)— y el secretario general Hastings Ismay impulsaron informes y análisis para entender tanto los éxitos como los fracasos de la alianza. Documentos como "NATO: The First Five Years" (1954), elaborado en parte por Eve Curie, hija de Marie Curie, ofrecen perspectivas valiosas sobre su evolución. Hoy, con escenarios que van desde la frontera oriental de Estonia —donde la ciudad de Narva simboliza la tensión histórica entre Rusia y Occidente— hasta la posible guerra por Taiwán (con estimaciones que varían entre 2025 y 2027), la OTAN enfrenta un futuro lleno de incertidumbres. Como señalaba Eisenhower, "incluso si fallamos, debemos entender por qué".